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Judicial Right Declaration and
Entrenched Discrimination
"[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy."' This
axiom generates an expectation that a court deliver a prompt remedy that
matches the articulated right. The virtue of this right-remedy obligation is
clear: By proceeding from an independent articulation of a right or viola-
tion to considerations for providing an adequate remedy, courts perform
not as choirs2 but instead as instruments of right-actualization.
The virtue of this matching, or unified, approach is open to question,
however, where remedial considerations are the primary source of conflict
and disagreement.' In constitutional cases involving entrenched discrimi-
nation, for example,4 controversial remedial costs often result from, and
increase with, the severity both of past discrimination and of the govern-
mental, judicial, and societal neglect in remedying the continuing effects of
prior discrimination. In these cases, a perceived obligation to deliver a
1. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *22 ("[lIt is a general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action of
law, whenever the right is invaded."); see also United States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145, 156 (1964)
(Black, J.) (stressing "[t]he need to eradicate past evil effects and to prevent the continuation or
repetition in the future of the discriminatory practices shown to be so deeply engrained in the laws,
policies and traditions").
2. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 246-47 (1962).
3. Abram Chayes has cogently analyzed how the relief in public law adjudication departs from
the relief in traditional adjudication, which imposes particularized remedies on the basis of individual
liability. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
Chayes asserts that in many of the most important legal disputes in a complex society, judges must
consider the relevant social environment if they are to provide remedial justice. In a prominent essay
on constitutional values and structural reform, Professor Fiss discusses challenges facing the judge in
complex public adjudication. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979). Fiss contends that as the quality of modem life is greatly
affected by large-scale bureaucratic institutions, the extent to which constitutional values play a role in
our lives will be contingent on the success of judges in implementing such values in large institutional
structures. Id. at 2-8. Fiss concedes that this will often be a trying task for judges, and may even
threaten judicial independence. Nonetheless, argues Fiss, this "core dilemma" must be confronted if
courts are to play their intended roles in protecting constitutional rights. Id. at 51-58.
This Note does not seek to enter the debate concerning judicial competence to implement complex
structural remedies. Compare 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) and Note, Judicial
Intervention and Organization Theory: Changing Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J.
513 (1980) with Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social Services?, 50 PuB. INTEREST 64 (1978)
(contending that judges lack competence to fashion complex social remedies). Instead, this Note seeks
to explore both the extent to which agreement on rights is possible where consideration of rights and
remedies is bifurcated, and the long-term effect such an articulation of rights might have in achieving
corrective justice in public law cases.
4. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Detroit school desegregation case); Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (Charlotte); United States v. Board of Educ. of Chicago,
744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984) (Chicago); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (Boston); Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd
sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Washington, D.C.).
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unified opinion can easily result in remedial factors exerting a backward
influence that restricts the scope of articulated rights. To allow such reme-
dial considerations to trim rights is to allow the depth of past wrongs and
majoritarian hositility or unwillingness to bear remedial costs to be instru-
mental in narrowing present and future rights. Whatever the merits of
contemplating such factors when devising relief,5 neither majority hostility
nor the severity of unremedied harm are appropriate considerations for
contracting the contours of minority rights. Because the core conflict in
cases of entrenched discrimination often involves remedial considerations
that are not appropriate to the formation of rights, this Note argues that
judges should conceptually and procedurally bifurcate their determination
of right and remedy to ensure the independent declaration of minority
rights.'
Bifurcation neither condones inadequate remedies nor guarantees full
remedies. Bifurcation simply requires that controversy over remedial costs
or judicial competence not obstruct the articulation of the full right at
stake,7 Although gaps between rights declared and remedies imposed can
5. The controversy over judicial desegregation orders cannot be seen totally as an issue of judicial
competence. Where massive resistance has been absent, courts have in the past used their equity
powers for far more complex matters, For example, around the turn of the century, "nearly 25 per-
cent of the entire railroad system of the country ha[d] been in receivership, the receivers becoming
virtually operators of this large fraction of the transportation system. Since 1870 there [had been] over
one thousand railroad receiverships." Berle, Receivership, in 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCI-
ENCEs 149 (1934).
6. The process of conceptual bifurcation advocated in this Note in no way alters established "case
or controversy" or justiciability doctrine. Cases of entrenched discrimination have in fact been distin-
guished by both their controversial and their adversarial nature. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resis-
tance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983) (discussing history of resistance to school desegregation decrees).
Difficult desegregation cases always involve analyzing and resolving the specific facts of a dispute and
not "opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1936). The Supreme Court has in fact, several times, been
willing to declare rights even though the capability for remedial enforcement was questionable. See
Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969) (bifurcating and deferring consideration of
whether or not coercive judicial relief was possible and issuing declaratory judgment invalidating ex-
clusion of Congressman Powell); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570-71 (1962) (Harlan, J.)
(inability of Court of Claims and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to enforce remedies against
the federal government "does not debar those courts from exercising the judicial power provided for in
Article III"); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318-21 (1904) (rendering decision in
suit for money between states, despite judicial impotence to enforce the award). See generally J.
NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrrTiONAL LAw 112-13 (2d ed. 1983). Furthermore,
the Supreme Court's approval of the Declaratory Judgment Act further supports the view that coer-
cive relief by the judiciary is not determinative of justiciability under Article III. See Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1936). The fact that bifurcation may allow courts to declare
rights broader than they themselves can, or will, enforce does not relieve other governmental parties
from an obligation to close the gap. See infra note 83.
7. It is important to distinguish between support for the process of bifurcation and the substantive
result of a particular remedial decision. For example, one could disapprove of the remedial balancing
in Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown If) (remedial decision permitting deliberate
speed), while still supporting the decision to bifurcate because it may have prevented the Court's
differences over remedies from obstructing their declaration of the right to be free from the effects of
state-imposed caste distinctions. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1) (unanimous
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exist under such an approach, the clear declaration of rights forces the
majority to confront8 the right-reality discrepancy and provides minorities
with a unifying claim to press for future judicial or majoritarian remedies.
I. MATCHING REMEDIES TO RIGHTS: Brown TO Swann
The declaration in Brown 1,9 that state-maintained school segregation is
unconstitutional, instantaneously created a wide discrepancy between con-
stitutional ideals and reality for black school children. In the years be-
tween Brown and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg,10 this disturbing gap
prompted civil rights advocates to push continually for judicial remedies
that would truly realize the rights articulated in Brown L
Brown ushered in a period of remedial crises. A decade after the deci-
sion only 1.2% of black children in the South were attending schools with
any whites."1 From a pure private-law perspective, in which a judicially
declared right is worth its weight only in judicially enforced remedies, the
right declared in Brown I was meaningless.
Despite the failure of Brown III' to command effective relief in the
"worst-remedy" 8 case of nationwide school desegregation, the right de-
clared in Brown I was the legal basis for victory in landmark Supreme
Court per curiam decisions outlawing segregation in city park facilities, 4
decision on right); see Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL 689, 697-78 (1971)
(Chief Justice Warren tried first to discuss the decree, but was only able to get unanimity when the
Justices agreed to decide the right and to defer consideration of the remedy).
Bifurcation, in fact, allows plaintiffs greater room to plead responsibly for broad remedies. Once the
court declares the right, plaintiffs do not have to fear that pleas for broad matching relief will scare
the court into narrowing the definition of the right or violation.
8. Conversely, denying the existence of a full right can legitimate a constitutionally distateful
condition. See Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or
Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1968):
As Professor Black has perceptively observed. . . when the Court upholds a statute's con-
stitutionality it "legitimates" it. When a statute expresses the most enlightened sentiments of
the community, this legitimating function may serve [an] important and creative purpose
.... But unfortunately the Court's seal of constitutional approval has the same effect where
the statute is a repressive one.
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 402 U.S. 1 (1970).
11. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LAW: DE-
SEGREGATION OF THE NATION'S PtBLIC SCHOOLS 6 (1976). As of August 1, 1963, there was not a
single desegregated school district in all of Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina, and only one in
Louisiana and Georgia. See H.R. REP. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2504-06.
12. 349 U.S. 267 (1955).
13. This Note uses the term "worst-remedy" to refer to cases in which the actualization of a
declared right would force the court to confront extreme political and social resistance. Even where
remedial concerns are appropriate for defining a right in such worst-remedy cases, the danger exists
that courts may narrow the general interpretation of the right, which will apply in cases where the
remedial problems do not exist, or where they are inappropriate to the claim of right at stake. A
perceived obligation to match right and remedy can thus encourage worst-remedy cases to have a
disproportionate influence on rights. This is a variation of the maxim, hard cases make bad law.
14. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
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public beaches and bath houses,15 municipal golf courses,'" public trans-
portation,'17 public athletic contests,"8 airport restaurants,' 9 and courtroom
seating.20 The right-declaration in Brown I enabled the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund successfully to challenge post-Brown district court cases
like Lonesome v. Maxwell2' that had initially upheld the "separate but
equal" principle in non-education cases.
The full force of the Brown I right-declaration, however, lay in its in-
teraction and interdependence with the political process. Gayle v. Brow-
der 22 provides a poignant example. The case arose from Rosa Park's re-
fusal to yield her front-of-the-bus seat on December 5, 1955 and Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s subsequent organizing of the nine-month Montgomery
bus boycott.28 This incident was most crucial to the non-violent civil rights
movement.24 On November 13, 1956, Dr. King declared victory, announc-
ing to a packed church that the Supreme Court (citing Brown), had found
segregated public buses unconstitutional.25 In examining this victory, one
15. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
16. New Orleans City Park v. Dretage, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S.
879 (1955).
17. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
18. State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959).
19. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
20. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
21. 123 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1954), rev'd sub nom. Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d
386 (4th Cir.), affid, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).
22. 352 U.S. 903 (1956). Gayle v. Browder shows that even within two years the right declared in
Brown I had gained force. At the district level, where a three-judge court had ruled in favor of
plaintiffs, Judge Seyborn H. Lynne dissented, declaring that "[o]nly a profound, philosophical disa-
greement" and his "study of Brown . . . convinced [him] that it left unimpaired the 'separate but
equal' doctrine in . . . local transportation." 142 F. Supp. 707, 717, 719-20 (M.D. Ala. 1956)
(Lynne, J., dissenting). Judge Lynne's dissent, as well as the Montgomery Board of Commissioner's
brief before the Supreme Court, argued that the Court's statement in Plessy v. Ferguson had involved
"not education but transportation." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 491; see Appellant's Jurisdictional State-
ment at 17, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). Judge Rive's opinion, however, stressed that
Brown, in conjunction with Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), and Holmes v.
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), had established a broader anti-caste or anti-segregation principle. 142
F. Supp. at 716-17. The Supreme Court obviously agreed; it affirmed per curiam, citing Brown,
Dawson and Holmes. The crucial point is that the remedial failures in Brown did not limit Brown's
power in changing the general interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, in actualizing
those rights in cases with less controversial remedies.
23. See generally M. KING, STRIDE TOWARDS FREEDOM (1962) (King's own account of Mont-
gomery bus boycott).
24. See M. KING, WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMm-uNTY? 17 (1967) (Mont-
gomery bus boycott "inspired and informed far-flung movements that included sit-ins, boycotts and
mass marches.., a new method of protest action had been born."); L. BENNETr, CONFRONTATION:
BLACK AND WHITE 11 (1966) ("Montgomery and Martin Luther King, Jr., created a revolutionary
point of departure which the sit-in students carried to a new stage of development."); P. CARROLL &
D. NOBLE, THE FREE AND THE UNFREE 406-07 (1977) ("From Montgomery, protests spread
throughout black communities. All aspects of Jim Crow caste patterns were being challenged.").
25. See J. BAss, UNLIKELY HEROES 76 (1981) (after the favorable Supreme Court decision,
"King called a mass meeting and ten thousand Negros jammed two of Montgomery's largest black
churches and the adjacent streets.").
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must ask not whether political protest or the Supreme Court was the de-
terminative factor. The story can be told only in their positive interaction.
Whereas Plessy v. Ferguson2" had frozen the anti-caste claims of
blacks, Brown fanned an already-sparked fire2" by placing the legal and
moral weight of the Constitution behind the black leadership who sought
to dismantle the southern caste system. More important than Brown II's
specific remedy was the tension of a highly visible gap between constitu-
tional rights and judicial remedies that fueled the political process. Mas-
sive resistance to judicial decrees forced white America to confront racism
openly,28 while allowing blacks to unify on several fronts behind the claim
of an unkept constitutional promise.29 Throughout the movement, Martin
Luther King sought to stir national dissonance by invoking the image of
the right-reality gap in American race relations."0 Eventually the political
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. Major chroniclers of this period have recognized Brown as crucial in spurring the civil rights
movement. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 749 (1975) ("The mass movement sparked by Brown
was unmistakably thriving as soon as six months after the Court handed down its implementation
decree"); see also J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 49 (1979) ("Brown was the catalyst that
. . . culminated in the two major Civil Rights acts.").
28. The role that the media plays in publicizing Court decisions and the social protests over right-
remedy gaps will often be crucial. This was particularly true in the Birmingham, Alabama protests of
1963. See Bickel, After a Civil RightsAct, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 9, 1964, at 11-15 (after nation
watched beating of protestors in Birmingham, a "new climate of national opinion was created on the
streets of Birmingham."); see also D. RAvrrcH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION
1945-1980, at 139 (1983) ("It seemed outrageous to the distant television viewer to see white men
striking blacks who were not resisting blows, in order to prevent the blacks from ordering a cup of
coffee or from sitting where they wished in a bus terminal."); M. KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT
(1964) (King's account of Birmingham protests).
29. Though they pressed for strong and immediate relief from the Court, plaintiff's attorneys in
Brown, Thurgood Marshall and Robert Carter, believed that the positive impact of Brown would
come largely from the political action that the right-declaration encouraged. See Carter & Marshall,
The Meaning and Significance of the Supreme Court Decree, 24 J. NEGRO EDUC. 397, 402-03
(1955);
The [Brown] decision opened the door for Negroes to secure unsegregated educational facilities
if they do so desire . . . [L]ittle will be done for the most part unless Negroes demand and
insist upon desegregation . . . [I]t will be accomplished only after a long and bitter fight, the
brunt of which will become a reality only if Negroes exhibit real militancy and press relent-
lessly for their rights.
30. See M. KING, supra note 24, at 10-11:
School desegregation is still 90 percent unimplemented across the land. . . . Thus America,
with segregationist obstruction and majority indifference, silently nibbled away at a promise of
true equality that had come before its time. . . . [F]or the Negro there is a credibility gap he
cannot overlook.
.At crucial points near the end of his life, President John F. Kennedy also forced the public to con-
front the discrepancy between American ideals and the plight of black Americans:
If an American, because his skin is dark. . . cannot send his children to the best public school
available. . . . [A]re we to say to the world-and much more importantly to each other-that
this is the land of the free, except for the Negroes; that we have no second-class citizens, except
Negroes; that we have no class or caste system, no ghettos, no master race, except with respect
to Negroes?
Television Address by President Kennedy, quoted in R. KLUGER, supra note 27, at 756.
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process responded, 1 and enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965," 3 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.3'
Moreover, the interaction between the judicial and political branches
was dialectical and mutually supportive. 5 While right declaration in-
spired majoritarian backing of antidiscrimination enforcement, such popu-
lar,36 legislative,3 7 and executive 8 support in turn gave the "least danger-
ous branch"3 9 the confidence that their bold remedial decrees would
ultimately be enforced. By the end of the 1960's, the Court had com-




31. Two years after Brown, sixty civil rights bills were given congressional hearings, resulting in
the 1957 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957); see Dep't of Justice, Office of
Att'y Gen., Order No. 155-57 (Dec. 9, 1957) (establishing Civil Rights Division). While the Act
authorized the federal government to obtain injunctions only in voting rights cases, it helped lay the
administrative framework for serious civil rights enforcement by the federal government.
In 1960, both national political parties committed themselves in their party platforms to a program
that would eliminate discrimination and encourage equal opportunity. These statements were promi-
nently cited in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See S. REP. No. 872, supra note
10, at 2362-63:
As to those matters within reach of political action and leadership,... We pledge the full use
of the power, resources, and leadership of the Federal Government to eliminate discrimination
based on race, color, religion, or national origin. . . . ("Building a Better American," Repub-
lican platform, 1960).
The peaceful demonstrations for first-class citizenship. . . are a signal to all of us to make
good at long last the guarantees of our Constitution . . . . The time has come to assure equal
access . . . to all areas of community life .... ("The Rights of Man," Democratic platform,
1960).
At many other prominent places in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the need
for legislation to close the right-remedy gap is stressed. See id. at 2504 ("[T]he constitutional right to
be free from racial discrimination in public education must be realized."); see also id., at 2368-77,
2393-94, 2410-12, 2503-19.
32. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000h
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
33. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973-1973dd (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
34. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631
(1976)).
35. See M. KING, THE WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 57 (1983):
Direct action is not a substitute for work in the courts and the halls of government. Bringing
about passage of a new and broad law. . . does not eliminate the necessity for bringing about
the mass dramatization of injustice in front of a city hall. Indeed, direct action and legal action
complement one another; when skillfully employed, each becomes more effective.
36. In 1959, 83% of parents in the south objected to their children attending a school that was
half-integrated. By 1970, only 43% objected to equally-integrated schools, while during the same time
span those parents objecting to marginal integration declined from 72% in 1959 to 16% in 1970. 3
THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 1598, 2010, 2211 (1972), reprinted in G.
ORFIELD, MUsT WE Bus? 109 (1978).
37. See supra notes 31-34.
38. For an account of the role of Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Divi-
sion and other Justice Department lawyers in using executive enforcement, see J. BAss, supra note
25, at 306-07 (1981) (Justice Department intervention in crucial Jefferson County Alabama case); V.
NAVASKY, KENNEDY JuSTIcE 96-155 (1971).
39. See A. BICKEL, supra note 2.
40. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1969) (district must convert to plan
that eliminated discrimination "root and branch").
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though it still had not authoratively defined the remedial obligations of
school authorities and district courts in implementing Brown I.
II. POST-SWANN: DENYING A RIGHT-REMEDY GAP
Unlike the major southern cases of the 1950's and 1960's, cases involv-
ing racially identifiable schools in northern urban centers did not also in-
volve a facially unconstitutional statute." Thus, northern cases demanded
a vital step unnecessary in adjudicating southern school segregation-the
plaintiff had to establish a violation itself. This required a complex in-
quiry. School segregation in many northern cities resulted directly from
residential racial containment42 in the inner core of those cities. While
local school board policies had often contributed substantially to this con-
dition, such residential segregation was inevitably the result of a network
of state policies.
43
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg was a pivotal point in school segrega-
tion cases.44 On one hand, Swann was typical of the southern de jure case
41. See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 582 n.1 (1st Cir. 1974) (citing twelve cases in western
and "northern cities where segregation had often resulted from local practices rather than laws."); see
also J. WILKINSON, supra note 27, at 55 ("The North had its own way of distancing the Negro, all
without segregation statutes. In the North, the barrier was housing, potentially the most effective of
all.").
42. The term "racial containment" refers to the process whereby public and private discrimina-
tion in housing, investment, and educational policies gradually concentrates minorities in the center
core of cities. Plaintiffs in Milliken v. Bradley used the terms "containment" and "confinement"
interchangeably in oral argument before the Supreme Court:
[A] series of mutually supportive, interlocking [governmental] devices, .... especially the seg-
regated school practices, operated in lockstep with an areawide metropolitan policy of confin-
ing by housing discrimination at the local level, at the governmental levels, both state and
federal ... confining black families to an identifiable core ... expanding, but still sur-
rounded by a white ring of reciprocal corresponding schools.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), reprinted in 80 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS 1223 (1980). (P. KURLAND & G. CASPER eds. 1977.)
43. Because of the state action requirement, the relevant inquiry is into the degree various govern-
mental actions caused, fostered, or encouraged racial isolation. See J. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN
AMERICA 30-52, 56-63, 86-91 (1980) (documenting discriminatory impacts of Federal Housing Ad-
ministration and Veterans Administration policies as well as local zoning policies); G. MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA 605-39 (1944) (discussing combination of governmental practices and customs
fostering residential segregation); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TwENTY YEARS AFTER Brown:
EQUAL OPPORTUNrrY IN HOUsING 3-13, 167-68 (1975) (discussing governmental influence in racial
covenants and residential segregation). For district court findings of state discrimination in school
desegregation cases, see infra notes 46, 53, 68, 69.
44. See Columbus Board of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 486 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J.,
dissenting):
During [1954-1964,] the issues confronted by the courts by and large involved combating the
devices by which States deliberately perpetuated dual school systems and dismantled segregated
systems in small, rural areas. . . .This Court did not begin to face the difficult adminstrative
and social problems associated with de facto segregation in large urban school systems until
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg. ..
See also Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 33 (1976) ("In Green the causal connection between past discrimina-
tion and the current racial composition of the schools was as clear as such matters ever can be ...
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in which segregation occurred by state law. On the other hand, Swann
provoked newer questions critical to northern cases concerning the proof,
intent, and causal impact of non-statutory state action and the constitu-
tionality of segregated schools resulting from neighborhood assignments in
residentially segregated neighborhoods."'
In the district court opinion, Judge McMillan found that a panoply of
state action-ranging from city planning and real estate zoning laws to
federal and state urban-renewal plans-had interwoven with and guided
private discrimination to cause residential segregation in Charlotte."'
When reviewing Judge McMillan's findings, however, the Supreme
Court was also aware of growing opposition to court-ordered desegrega-
tion.47 The Court may have concluded that to affirm such a wide-ranging
violation along with a judicial obligation to provide immediately a match-
ing remedy would give ambitious district court judges an overly-
In this respect, Green was the Court's last easy school desegregation case.").
45. Many scholars and judges have defined the violation at stake in Brown I as the state-fostered or
maintained caste status of an identifiable sub-group. For the most comprehensive presentation of this
theory, see Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle-Toward a Constitutional Standard for Review of
Race Cases, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 42-61 (1983) (inner city ghettoization caused by variety of state
policies that should be remedied by variety of state policies); see also Williams v. City of New Orle-
ans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1573 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1984) (Wisdom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (approving Dimond's anti-caste principle in defining systematic discrimination by New Orleans
Police Department); cf Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1972) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) ("[A] State is barred from creating by one device or another ghettoes that determine the school
one is compelled to attend."); Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 442-43 (1968) (Stewart, J.,) ("[Wlhen
racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color
of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.").
Variations of an anti-caste principle were first delivered in three prominent law review artides
defending the holding in Brown. See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 64 YALE
L.J. 421, 425 (1960); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 161 (1955); Pollak, Racial
Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 28
(1959).
46. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecldenberg, 300 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D.N.C.), 306 F. Supp. 1299
(W.D.N.C. 1969), affd in part and vacated in part, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), affd in part
and vacated in part, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In Charlotte, blacks had "become concentrated almost en-
tirely in one quadrant of a city of 270,000." 300 F. Supp. at 1360. In order to impose affirmative
duties on the school board, Judge McMillan had to establish a causal relationship between the state
and the residential segregation. Instead of relying solely on the segregation law or the acts of the
school board in establishing the violation, McMillan traced the role state policies had played since
1900 in causing residential segregation. Id. at 1365.
47. See G. ORFIELD, supra note 36, at 109-12. Richard Nixon ran an anti-busing campaign in
1972. Id. at 335-40. On March 16, 1972, Nixon asked Congress in a nationally televised speech to
enact legislation stripping much of the courts' desegregation powers. Id. at 335. On June 23, 1972,
Congress did in fact pass anti-busing legislation, the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
92-318, 86 Stat. 235, codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1651-56 (1982). The bill was interpreted, however, as
applicable only where no constitutional violation had been found. See 2 N. DoRSEN, P. BENDER, B.
NEUBORNE & S. LAW, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 693-94 (4th ed.
1979).
Polls in 1965 "showed that people saw action against discrimination as the most important question
before the country . . . .During the early 1970s, the public seemed less and less concerned." See G.
ORFIELD, supra, at 110. The public ranked black problems as 24th out of 27th in 1972, and last out
of 30th in 1974, in polls ranking national priorities. Id.
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controversial blank check to restructure a wide range of state and local
governmental policies.48
Swann can be understood as an attempt to resolve these right-remedy
matching tensions. By authorizing broad and immediate judicial power to
remedy proven constitutional violations, the Supreme Court could claim it
was at last closing the remedial gap left by Brown I. At the same time,
however, by limiting its violation inquiry to the actions of local school
authorities and deliberately ignoring "the myriad factors . . . [that] . . .
can cause discrimination in a multitude of ways,"49 the Court foreclosed
the potential for broad state-wide intervention and for judicial considera-
tion of the segregative effects of a network of state policies.
But why the focus only on school boards? Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion had only centered the remedial focus on school boards. In the four
cases joined in Brown, state statutes had been the direct source of the
violation.50 A subtle, yet influential, form of judicial activism occurred in
Swann when the Court explicitly chose not to reach the issue of whether
"other types of state action, without any discriminatory action by the
school authorities, is a constitutional violation requiring remedial action
by a school desegregation decree."
'51
48. During oral arguments in Swann, the Court specifically asked Solicitor General Ervin Gris-
wold "are we talking about the substantive right. . . or. . . the appropriate remedy. . .? They are
different are they not?" Griswold replied, "Yes, Mr. Justice, but they are intertwined." The Court
again pressed whether there was a difference between the "substantive constitutional right that each
individual public school student has. . . [and] what is required of a court to disestablish. . . . They
are interrelated, but they are also different." Griswold conceded they "are different questions," but
found it "difficult to contend that if the right was established that the remedy could not be devised to
protect the right." The inquiring Justice immediately replied, "My point is that if there is such an
absolute Constitutional right, then that right exists in Chicago, North Dakota or Cincinnati or De-
troit, as well as in Charlotte." Transcript of Oral Argument, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402
U.S. 1 (1971), THE COMPLETE ORAL ARUGMENTS OF -THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1970 TERM 53 (emphasis added).
An insightful look into the Court's concerns appears in R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN 101-02 (1979). A passage describes Justice Potter Stewart pondering the affirmance of
District Judge McMillan's sweeping decision in Swann:
From Stewart's point of view, McMillan had put the Court on the spot. Two decades before,
it would have been easier for the Court to back McMillan up. Then, Northern Democrats and
Northern Republicans had given bipartisan support to the Court's desegregation orders. Al-
though President Eisenhower had never enforced the orders with any enthusiasm, at least he
had not campaigned against them as Nixon had done.
Id. at 101-02.
49. Swann, 402 U.S. at 22.
50. In the Topeka case, Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951), plaintiff
sought to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute that permitted cities with populations of over 15,000
to maintain segregated schools. In the other three cases joined, Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529
(E.D.S.C. 1951), 103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952); David v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337
(E.D. Va. 1952); and Belton v. Gebhart, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 87 A.2d 862 (1952), plaintiffs all sought to
enjoin enforcement of state statutes and state constitutions that required the maintenance of segregated
schools. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 486 & n.1 (1954).
51. 402 U.S. at 23.
1749
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1741, 1985
At the trial in Milliken v. Bradley,52 Judge Roth was forced to confront
the limitations of focusing only on particular school boards when defining
both the violation and the remedy. Roth realized that where a network of
state policies had created a condition of inner-city racial containment,
53
any remedy within the contained area would perpetuate rather than elim-
inate the discriminatory violation. Holding the state of Michigan ulti-
mately responsible, Roth contemplated a busing remedy reaching into
fifty-four white school districts surrounding the Detroit inner-city area.'
4
Roth's decree may have provoked the worst-remedy fears contemplated
by the Supreme Court in Swann." Where the violation was defined so
broadly, the required matching remedy would affect thousands of whites
who saw themselves as innocent, 6 while inviting district courts to inter-
vene broadly in local and state government without popular support.
The Supreme Court reacted in Milliken by limiting the violation, defin-
ing it as "Detroit-only,"' and parading the "horribles" involved in Judge
Roth's remedial decree.' 8 This discussion, however, exposed the Court's
preoccupation with remedial crises. 59 The Sixth Circuit had vacated
52. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affid, 484 F.2d 215, 251-52 (6th
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
53. See 338 F. Supp. at 587:
Governmental actions and inaction at all levels, federal, state and local, have combined, with
those of private organizations, such as loaning institutions and real estate associations and
brokerage firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout
the Detroit Metropolitan area. . . .For many years FHA and VA openly advised and advo-
cated the maintenance of "harmonious" neighborhoods, i.e., racially and economically
harmonious.
For an excellent account of the trial in Milliken, see P. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING (1985).
54. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). Judge Roth never actually ordered
any busing decree; rather, he appointed a panel to prepare plans for an effective metropolitan desegre-
gation remedy. Id. at 917. See infra note 63.
55. See supra note 48.
56. The Supreme Court remains concerned about innocent third parties in anti-discrimination
remedies. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2593 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (district courts must "carefully balanc[e] the competing interests of discriminatees
[and] innocent employees"). But see Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 828, 846-47 (1983) ("Any claim of innocent third parties to be free from harmful consequences
rooted in past discrimination is not superior to the constitutional rights of equally innocent black
victims.").
57. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 746 ("The Constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in
Detroit is to attend a unitary district in that district.") (emphasis added).
58. See 418 U.S. at 743:
The metropolitan remedy would require, in effect, consolidation of 54 independent school dis-
tricts historically administered as separate units into a vast new super school district ....
Entirely apart from the logistical and other serious problems attending large-scale transporta-
tion of students, the consolidation would give rise to an array of other problems in financing
and operating this new school system.
The Court then asked eight consecutive questions pertaining to remedial practicality. Id.
59. The Court was clearly worried about the Sixth Circuit's approval of the state responsibility
ruling by the district court, see 418 U.S. at 734 n.16, and its conclusion that some interdistrict remedy
would be necessary to prevent the Detroit schools from being all-black. Id. at 735; see Milliken v.
Bradley, 484 F.2d at 238-41 (state-school board agency relationship); id. at 245 (interdistrict remedy
1750
Judicial Right Declaration
Roth's remedial decree,60 and even Richard Nixon's Solicitor General,
Robert Bork, had asked only that the case be remanded so as to join the
affected suburban school districts and take evidence "concerning any con-
stitutional violations involving the suburban districts and any interdistrict
racially segregated impact of the Detroit violations.""1
The Supreme Court thus had a built-in opportunity to deliver a bifur-
cated opinion; with no remedial decree before it, the Court could have
spoken purely in terms of the right involved.62 Instead, the Court carefully
defined an intra-district, local school-board-oriented violation" that al-
lowed for matching intra-district remedies at the expense of exploring the
deeper causes and potential cures for racial containment in the inner cit-
ies.6 4 The focus on local school boards that began as a remedial strategy in
necessary). Unwilling to permit a right-remedy gap or to allow the district court to become a "de facto
legislative authority" or "school superintendent," 418 U.S. at 743-44, the Supreme Court chose to
narrow the right to fit only an intra-district remedy. See supra note 57.
60. The Sixth Circuit had vacated the remedy and remanded to the district court with instructions
that it join the affected district under FED. R. Civ. P. 19. See 484 F.2d 215, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1973).
61. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 26-27, Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974). To be sure, Solicitor General Bork argued for violation standards almost identical to
those that the Court adopted. See id. at 10-22. Nonetheless, the remand suggested by Bork would
have at least permitted further discussion of the connection of housing discrimination and school segre-
gation in inner cities. By simply deciding that the violation was "Detroit-only," the Court was in
effect saying that it was unwilling to look at the interdistrict effects of state-influenced housing
discrimination.
In Milliken, the Supreme Court refused to consider housing violations because the Sixth Circuit
had not relied on them. 418 U.S. at 728 n.8. This was a highly questionable procedural judgment.
While plaintiffs had not pressed their "racial containment" theory before the Sixth Circuit as the sole
grounds for affirming Judge Roth's ruling, they relied heavily on this theory (including its area-wide
housing discrimination component) as an alternative ground for affirmance before the Supreme Court.
See Brief for Respondents at 40-53, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Transcript of Oral
Argument, reprinted in 80 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS 1222-26 (1980). Under
traditional Supreme Court practice, plaintiffs are entitled to have such an issue either heard or re-
manded (as Bork had suggested) for further consideration. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 53-54 (5th ed. 1978).
62. There is a wide agreement among scholars of different ideologies that the Supreme Court
limited the conception of the violation in Milliken as a result of remedial pressures. See J. WILKIN-
SON, supra note 27, at 223-29; Fiss, supra note 3, at 47 (Burger Court using tailoring principle to
limit right conception); Freeman, Legitimating Racial Discrimiation Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MNN. L. Rav. 1049 1107-11 (1978) (Court
has used a "perpetrator" perspective to limit violations dealing with the victim's condition); Nagel,
Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 666, 715
(1978).
63. The Court was not deterred by the fact "that all of these vital operational problems are yet to
be resolved by the District Court, and that this is the purpose of the Court of Appeals' proposed
remand." 418 U.S. at 743.
64. In Milliken, Justice Stewart did acknowledge in a concurring opinion that inter-district bus-
ing might still be appropriate where the "state officials had contributed to the separation of the races
by drawing or redrawing school district lines, . . . by transfer of school units between districts, ...
or by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws." 418 U.S. at 755 (Stew-
art, J., concurring). Since Milliken, plaintiffs have occasionally been able to meet the burden required
for inter-district remedies. See Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.) (three-judge court)
(interdistrict remedy for Wilmington, Del.), affd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975) (per curiam); United States v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 456 F. Supp. 183, 188-90 (S.D. Ind. 1978), affd in part and vacated in
part, 637 F.2d 1101, 1108-10 (7th Cir.), cer denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); see also Liddell v.
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Brown II had now become a means to limit state liability for equal pro-
tection violations.
The Court has relied on this narrow focus even when ruling in favor of
minority plaintiffs. In both Keyes v. School District No. 16 and Colum-
bus v. Penick6" the Court justified strong remedial decrees, not by explor-
ing the networks of state action that can cause or contribute to racial con-
tainment, but by overplaying the role of individual, or institution-specific
fault in causing segregation.
67
III. RIGHT-DECLARATION AND SHAPING PERSPECTIVES
A. Removing Focus from the State: The Perception of Hopelessness
The trial courts in Swann, Milliken, Columbus v. Penick,68 and Evans
v. Buchanan"9 realized that, where the constitutional harm resulted from
racial confinement in inner cities, no amount of reshuffling within the
racially identifiable center city could in fact break down the state-fostered
barriers that excluded black students from the societal mainstream. Effec-
tive responses to such segregative conditions, therefore, might require cre-
Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (implicitly recognizing state responsibility theory
by approving voluntary interdistrict remedy largely funded by the state). For a discussion of the use of
housing discrimination in interdistrict remedies, see Note, Housing Discrimination as a Basis for
Interdistrict School Desegregation Remedies, 93 YALE L.J. 340 (1983).
65. 413 U.S. 189, 207-09 (1973).
66. 443 U.S. 449, 461-68 (1979).
67. In Keyes, Justice Brennan ordered district-wide relief by extending to anti-discrimination law
the evidentiary presumption that proof of an individual's guilty intent in one sphere is prima facie
grounds for presuming the same intent in highly related decisions. 413 U.S. at 207-09. This analysis
so disturbed Justice Douglas that he wrote separately, criticizing Justice Brennan's quasi-criminal
analysis and arguing that state policies that knowingly cause racial ghettoization are the components
of an equal protection violation. Id. at 216-17 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("When a State forces, aids,
or abets, or helps create a racial 'neighborhood,' it is a travesty of justice to treat that neighborhood as
sacrosanct."). This has been the only time a member of the liberal wing of the Court has, in post-
Brown cases, written separately to criticize a favorable desegregation ruling.
The opinion in Columbus does not diverge from the school board focus either. Justice White ig-
nored the variety of housing, investment, and real estate discrimination found by Judge Duncan at the
trial, 429 F. Supp. 229, 258-59 (S.D. Ohio 1977), and instead wrote that the "systemwide segrega-
tion in the Columbus schools. . . was the result of recent and remote intentionally segregative actions
of the Columbus [School] Board." 443 U.S. at 463-64.
68. 443 U.S. 449 (1979). At the trial level, Judge Duncan found that "housing segregation has
been caused in part by federal agencies which deal with financing of housing, local housing authori-
ties, financing institutions, developers, . . . zoning and annexation . . . ." 429 F. Supp. at 259.
Judge Duncan further found that the "interaction of housing and schools operates to promote segrega-
tion in each." Id.
69. Judge Caleb M. Wright found that specific policies of intentional discrimination were en-
couraged in the Federal Housing Administration mortgage underwriting manual. Evans v. Buchanan,
393 F. Supp. 428, 434 (D. Del. 1975). He also found that language in the Code of Ethics-published
by the State-declared that "[a] realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighbor-
hood. . . members of any race. . . whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in
that neighborhood." This language was not eliminated until 1970. Id. at 434-35.
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ative remedial responses from the state that would involve governmental
institutions outside of the racially contained area.
By fragmenting state authority into local school districts for purposes of
both the remedial reach of courts and defining'the scope of equal protec-
tion clause violations, Millikeni cramped the potential for both effective
judicial and political responses to racial isolation. While restricting the use
of inter-district busing partially stripped federal courts of a familiar reme-
dial tool for alleviating racially identifiable school districts, compartmen-
talizing state authority in defining the right did something more: It meant
that no governmental body with the capability to confront racial contain-
ment was under constitutional compulsion to come forth with any signifi-
cant remedy at all.
Furthermore, after Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,"
district courts no longer had jurisdiction even to confront alternative reme-
dies where white flight caused resegregation. Thus, evasion of a desegre-
gation decree became not only a remedial obstacle, but a basis for dispel-
ling a constitutional violation. Through Milliken and Pasadena, the
Supreme Court thus promoted the societal perception that those aspects of
racial ghettoization that fell outside the narrowly defined violations were
constitutionally legitimate 1 and remedially hopeless.
Attributing responsibility to the state as a whole1 2 would alter the
70. 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (where white flight from school district or resegregation occurs, after
decree has been implemented, district court does not have jurisdiction to modify decree to maintain
integration). But see id. at 442-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (claiming that unitary system has never
been reached, so initial decree was never fully implemented).
71. This critique of Milliken-that it served to legitimate racial ghettoization-is shared by J.
Harvie Wilkinson, a recent Reagan appointee to the Fourth Circuit, and the author of the best con-
servative account of the post-Brown segregation decisions.
By ignoring housing, the Supreme Court began to lift from white America responsibility for
the ghetto. Milliken v. Bradley was an act of absolution. Segregated Detroit schools were not
the suburbs' creation and thus not their burden . . . "[w]hite society is deeply implicated in
the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society con-
dones it." Because the Court had been the last hope for blacks, its decision rang like a final
sentence.
J. WILKINSON, supra note 27, at 224-25 (citation omitted). For the best account from a critical legal
perspective, see Freeman, supra note 62, at 1102-19 (Milliken was integral in the "Era of Rationali-
zation" of racial discrimination).
72. State responsibility implies not just that the state will be responsible for ensuring an intra-
district remedy, but that the state may not draw lines within itself to excuse itself from responsibility
for remedying state-induced conditions of racial containment. This conception does not offend the rule
that remedies must not exceed the scope of the violation. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402
U.S. 1, 16 (1970). Rather it recognizes that the state must be seen as part of the violation when it
allows government-fostered racial discrimination to go unremedied within its jurisdiction. This con-
ception seeks only to harmonize current equal protection jurisprudence with the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "[N]or shall any State. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." As Justice White wrote in dissent, the result of Milliken is that:
the State of Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has success-
fully insulated itself from its duty to provide effective desegregation remedies. . . . The Court
draws the remedial line at the Detroit school district boundary, even though the Fourteenth
Amendment is addressed to the State and even though the State denies equal protection of the
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frameworks in Milliken and Pasadena that promote perceptions of hope-
lessness and false legitimization. When courts view a fragment of the state
(e.g., a local school district) as the party remedially responsible for segre-
gation, flight from or racial isolation of that district denies possibilities of
meaningful remedies while allowing for judicial denial of the continuation
of constitutional harm.73 When courts view the state as a whole as respon-
sible, white flight and racial containment, however troublesome as reme-
dial obstacles,74 would not obscure the judicial recognition and societal
perception of constitutional tension.
From this vantage point, one can unscramble the fundamental paradox
of Justice Powell's contention that where only majoritarian processes can
fully remedy social ills such as racial containment, federal courts should
limit their findings of constitutional violations.7 5 Courts are inextricably
and unavoidably actors in the political environment. Through their right
declarations and findings, courts either inspire or inhibit the political
processes that Justice Powell thinks suitable to create complex remedies.
7
1
laws when its public agencies, acting in its behalf, invidiously discriminate. The State's default
is the "condition that offends the Constitution."
418 U.S. at 763, 771-72 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 16-17 (1958) ("'Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, . . . denies or
takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the
name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State."') (quoting
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880)); see also Dimond, supra note 45, at 6 ("[T]he anti-
caste principle does not permit judicial compartmentalization of overall governmental responsibility
for caste discrimination."); Schnapper, supra note 56, at 842 ("The division of responsibility among
several officials should not affect the underlying constitutional obligation of the state that employs, and
acts through, all of them."); Note, supra note 64, at 346 ("[S]tate officials cannot escape the force of
the equal protection clause simply by splintering or rearranging authority.").
73. Ironically, states have displayed their multi-faceted power to affect racial balance most vividly
in attempting to avoid segregation. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221-25
(1964) (Virginia and Prince Edward County manipulated state constitution, tuition grants, tax laws,
and property tax credits to keep public schools in Prince Edward County closed for five years and
avoid desegregation). With the state generally exempted from ultimate responsibility for desegrega-
tion, "only a very limited effort appears to have been made to conduct research on the efficacy of state
action [in school desegregation]." CENTER FOR EDUC. AND HUM. DEV. PoL., STATE STRATEGIES
FOR REDUCING ISOLATION 2 (1981). Yet the National Project and Task Force on Desegregation
Strategies finds that "as the 1980s begin, the single most promising strategy for progress in school
desegregation may well be that of state initiative." STATE LEADERSHIP TOWARD DESEGREGATING
EDUCATION: A POSrrIvE FUTRE 5 (1980). See generally C. WILLIE, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
PLANS THAT WORK 29-39 (1984) (importance of state responsibility in school desegregation).
74. See Gewirtz, supra note 6, at 532-35. Professor Gewirtz presents the difficulty of implement-
ing effective desegregation decrees, even for "rights-maximizing" judges, considering the realities of
white flight. Id. Gewirtz' article assumes that courts only have jurisdiction over local school authori-
ties. Where, however, the state as a whole is responsible, white flight would be less of an obstacle to
right-maximization, because the means for combating flight and containment would be greatly
expanded.
75. Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 451 n.18 (1979) (Powell,
J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) ("Because the causes of segregation in residential housing
are usually beyond judicial correction, wider solutions that will be acceptable to concerned parents
must be sought by legislators and executive officials.").
76. Justice Powell's opinions are the most susceptible to the claim that remedial concerns are
affecting both the scope and the findings of constitutional violations. Powell has often sought to deny
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While the Supreme Court confronted worst-remedy cases in both Brown
and Milliken, by bifurcating its opinion in Brown the Court at least cre-
ated a constitutional vision gap that encouraged a constructive political
response. In Milliken, by contrast, the Court encouraged social compla-
cency by formulating the violation so narrowly as to close any remedial
gap between constitutional values and the conditions of racial ghettoiza-
tion.7 The Court thereby squandered the opportunity to make the major-
equal protection violations while basing much of his argument on remedial considerations. His discus-
sion of remedies in Estes, see supra note 75, echoes his arguments in Columbus v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449, 479 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting), where, in opposing the majority's finding of a system-wide
violation, he argued that "restructuring and overseeing the operation of major public school sys-
tems-as ordered in these cases-fairly can be viewed as social engineering that hardly is appropriate
for the federal judiciary . . . ." Id. at 487. See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 56 (1972) (Powell, J.) (articulating concerns about "practical ramifications" of holding
Texas' public financing system unconstitutional; asserting that "[The constitutional judgment...
approved by our dissenting Brothers today would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented
upheaval in public education . . . . there is nothing simple or certain about predicating the conse-
quences of massive change in the financing and control of public education.") But see id. at 58 (Pow-
ell's interesting disclaimer: "These practical considerations, of course, play no role in the adjudication
of the constitutional issues presented here. But they serve to highlight the wisdom of the traditional
limitations on this Court's function.").
Justice Powell's opinions on the intent requirement also support the contention that remedial con-
cerns have influenced his rulings on violations and even standing. In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189 (1973), Powell essentially bifurcated his attack on busing remedies from his discussion of the
violation and issued an opinion highly critical of the intent standard and the de facto/de jure distinc-
tion. Id. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I would not, however, perpet-
uate the de jure/de facto distinction nor would I leave to petitioners the initial tortuous effort of
identifying 'segregative acts' and deducing 'segregative intent."'). In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975) Powell continued to de-emphasize racial considerations in the decisionmaking process. Powell,
in fact, denied standing by requiring a nearly impossible burden of proof as to the likelihood of
harmful impact. After the imposition of the process-oriented intent standard for an equal protection
violation, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), Powell perhaps realized that the intent stan-
dard, because of its "tortuous" evidentiary burden, is a more effective means to limiting violations,
such as residential zoning and school desegregation, that lead to the wide-ranging judicial remedies he
objects to. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977),
Powell completely flip-flopped, de-emphasizing the importance of discriminatory impact in determin-
ing standing and constitutional violations, and issued instead, one of the narrowest discriminatory
purpose rulings.
The suggestion that Justice Powell might declare broader rights were he to bifurcate his right-
remedy rulings finds support in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In that case, where a
majoritarian institution had devised the remedy, Powell was more willing to accept claims that group
inequality is causally related to past discrimination. "Although the discriminatory activities were not
identified with the exactitude expected in judicial or administrative adjudication, it must be
remembered that 'Congress may paint with a much broader brush than may this Court . Id. at
503, 506 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
77. Had the Supreme Court sought to confront the full depth and intricacies of racial containment
in Milliken v. Bradley or other segregation cases in the 1970's, a remedial gap likely would have
resulted. However great the immediate remedial neglect, political reality does not stand still. The
1982 Voting Rights Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1973 to 1973bb-I (1982)), the increase in the number of minority mayors in large cities, and
increased voter turnout among minorities, see T. CAVANAGH & D. STOCKTON, BLACK ELECTED
OFFICIALS AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES (1983), together may have enhanced the potential for
majoritarian remedies had the problems of northern caste at least remained on the political agenda
during the decade since Milliken L Surely Jesse Jackson, as Dr. King before him, could have invoked
a decade-long constitutional gap to stir majoritarian conscience. But Milliken did not proclaim rights;
it did not stir ideals or create political tension. Instead, it fulfilled the prophecy of Gunnar Myrdal,
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ity confront the discrepency between its constitutional values and the con-
ditions of historically outcast groups."8 The problem thus is not only that,
as Justice Powell recognizes, there are limits to law in bringing social
justice, but also that law may be quelling the social processes that gener-
ate social justice.
B. Narrowing Dialogue; Limiting Choices
By consistently severing off the conditions of schools and the action of
local school boards from the broader problem of racial containment, the
Supreme Court encouraged scholarly and public debate"9 over a false is-
sue: Could purely school-oriented desegregation decrees bring quantifiable
improvements to young minorities residing in the nation's slums and ghet-
tos?80 Within this public dialogue, the merits of any substantial govern-
mental effort to attack past state-fostered discrimination often became re-
duced to analyzing whether or not racial busing improved scores on
standardized educational tests. Where school desegregation remedies have
not quickly improved test scores many have denigrated school desegrega-
tion remedies and overlooked the limited scope of the remedial approach
compared to the breadth and complexity of the problem. Judicial recogni-
tion of racial containment and the obligation of the State to address it
might have encouraged remedies responsive to racial isolation other than
busing and other pupil-assignment remedies.81
see G. MYRDAL, supra note 43, at 617-52, by removing the problems of racial containment from
national consciousness and constitutional analysis just as the very process of racial isolation had physi-
cally removed the problems of discrimination from the eyesight and everyday lives of much of white
America.
78. Sometimes the prestige of the Supreme Court causes right-declaration alone to inspire imme-
diate majoritarian remedies. Over three hundred school districts moved to desegregate voluntarily be-
tween Brown I and Brown II. See H. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS 2391, 2504. Recently, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct.
3244 (1984) the Supreme Court ruled that the Minnesota Supreme Court was justified in finding that
the local Jaycee chapter did fall within the meaning of a public accommodation and thus could not
deny women full membership under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. While the ruling had force
only in Minnesota, the National Jaycees immediately changed their national bylaws to allow women.
SeeJaycees Vote to Admit Women to Membership, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1984, at A8, col. 1.
79. See Craine & Mahard, Desegregation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 17 (1978) ("[Alchievement tests have received an undeserved emphasis
in the desegregation literature . . . [and] the emphasis is embarrassing.").
80. Evidence generally indicates that school desegregation does improve minority test scores. See
Daniels, In Defense of Busing, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983, § 6 at 34, col. 2; see also Craine &
Mahard, supra note 79, at 48 (most tests show gains for minorities, but such studies inherently
problematic). But see Werner, Busing and Quotas Assailed by Meese, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1985, at
40, col. 6 (Attorney General Meese stating "it's generally recognized in educational as well as legal
circles that school busing has had a marginal effect as far as improvement is concerned, and actually
in some cases has added to the deterioration of the situation"). Whatever the merits of such studies,
the public and scholarly focus on the results has often detracted from the true constitutional issue: the
governmental obligation to remedy the effects of discriminatory state action that have left barriers to
first-class citizenship.
81. Professor Dimond argues that while a broader conception of constitutional violation would
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C. Right-Declaration and Remedial Expectations: Statutory Examples
While bifurcation raises the danger of de-emphasizing the enforcement
of minority rights,82 the expectations created by right-declaration may en-
hance political awareness, provoke the interest of the media and social
researchers, and eventually lead to full relief.83 Civil rights progress often
proceeds in stages. Title VII had serious enforcement shortcomings when
passed in 1964. Yet the Act enhanced societal expectations of equal em-
ployment opportunities which inspired tougher remedial mechanisms
under state statutes and the 1972 Amendments to Title VII.84
involve more levels of the state, it would allow state governments more opportunities to alleviate caste
barriers without busing if they so desired. See Dimond, supra note 45, at 42-48. A governmental
responsibility approach would require courts to shift from a quasi-criminal perspective to a more
appropriate modern tort law approach in confronting entrenched discrimination. Cf G. CALABRESI,
THE CosTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (emphasizing cost-spreading over individualistic fault).
82. This danger is real and should be seen as the major problem with the theory of judicial review
advocated in this Note. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. Full remedies for decades of
entrenched discrimination, however, require a long-term remedial commitment. South Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mt. Laurel I),
provides a significant case study. In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court approved a 1973 finding
that Mount Laurel should remedy its long-standing discriminatory zoning policy. Mount Laurel I, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975). This was a pure case of a bifurcated right-declaration with an almost
complete remedial gap. "[Tlen years after . . . Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly ex-
clusionary ordinance . . . there is widespread non-compliance." 92 N.J. 198-99, 456 A.2d 410. The
court, however, declared itself "more firmly committed to the original Mount Laurel doctrine than
ever, and. . . determined, within appropriate judicial bounds, to make it work." Id. Within a year of
Mt. Laurel II, public debate had turned to how and who should control and bear the costs for the
required low income housing construction. See Sullivan, Builders Assail Kean on Mt. Laurel Stand,
N.Y. Times Jan. 20, 1984, at XI: 1, col. 1. While the case itself is certainly controversial, the con-
struction of substantial housing is assumed, and the implementation problems are receiving great at-
tention from the state legislators as well as social science researchers at Rutgers and Princeton. See
Oser, Jersey Town Faces Mt. Laurel Mandate, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1984, at VIII: 7, col. 1.
83. The breadth of the right declared-even if not fully remedied by the judiciary-may expand
what state and federal courts see as permissible majoritarian remedies authorized by § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, by the spending powers clause, and by state legislatures. Conversely, federal
courts should permit Congress (under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment) and state courts to expand
protection of constitutional rights to their full measure, where previous constitutional rulings had been
limited because of concern for judicial competence and not because the federal courts had expressed
the outer limits of the constitutional norm. See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Under-
enforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1213 (1978). This Note shares a funda-
mental conception expressed by Professor Sager. Where institutional concerns cause federal courts to
narrow constitutional rights, the breadth of constitutional rights should not be seen as coterminous
with federal judicial enforcement. Unlike this Note, however, Sager presents the federal judiciary as
reactive. After Congress or state courts act to broaden constitutional rights, Sager suggests that the
Supreme Court can justify its deference by recognizing, post-facto, that a gap had previously existed
between the breadth of the constitutional norm and federal judicial enforcement. Id. at 1239-40,
1247-50. If a gap exists, however, why should an independent judiciary not take the initiative and
define the full right? Sager may be implicitly contending that despite the Supreme Court's role as
final arbiter, "Congress and state courts [may help] to shape elusive constitutional norms at their
margins." Id. at 1264. Nonetheless, the failure to act first may serve to legitimize a condition at odds
with constitutional norms. See Wright, supra note 8.
84. While Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the landmark legislation that outlawed
employment discrimination, see Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), a gap between the right and
its enforcement existed after the act's passage. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
sought to address this problem by giving the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission enforce-
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In Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,5 the
Supreme Court declared differential pension contributions by sex violative
of Title VII, while denying retroactive relief. Make-whole relief, accord-
ing to the Court, might involve fifty million workers and $400 billion of
retirement reserves.86 Whether or not such worst-remedy fears were valid,
the Court, by bifurcating its decision, declared a powerful prospective
right that altered public perspectives and fueled the processes that led to
national legislation in 1984.8"
D. Bifurcation and Value Formation
Disputes over ideals often mask concern over the burdens or benefits
the realization of those ideals would have on the self-interest of existing
parties.88 When the Supreme Court restrictively defines rights in times of
remedial resistance or impracticability, it allows one majority's resis-
tance-or cost-benefit decision-to limit the societal visions and constitu-
tional ideals passed on to future generations.8 9 Conversely, by stressing
ment powers and by expressly giving judges more flexible remedial powers. See Pub. L. No. 92-261,
86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1976)). The right declared in 1964 created pressure for
these broader remedial measures which would have had little chance of passage in 1964. The Confer-
ence Report in 1972 read:
Despite the commitment of Congress to the goal of equal employment opportunity for all
citizens, the machinery created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not adequate.
Despite the progress which has been made since passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
discrimination against minorities and women continues. The persistence of discrimination, and
its detrimental effects require a reaffirmation of our national policy of equal opportunity in
employment. It is essential that seven years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
effective enforcement procedures be provided the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
to strengthen its effort to reduce discrimination in employment.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2139.
85. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Manhart was the first major litigation effort to challenge differential
pension contributions based on the longer lifespan of women. See Manhart v. Los Angeles Dep't of
Water and Power, 652 F.2d 904, 908 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (liberal award of attorneys fees based partly
on risk taken by lawyers because "case was the first to challenge pension contribution [sex] differ-
ences"). Justice Stevens was clearly concerned that full retroactive relief might penalize pension man-
agers and investors who had no reason to believe they were violating the spirit or law of Title VII.
Rather than avoid a broad right-declaration in order to minimize his worst-remedy concerns, Stevens
declared a right to sex-neutral pension contributions and relied on the grant of equitable discretion
under Title VII to deny retroactive relief for those particular claims. See 435 U.S. at 723 ("Without
qualifying the force of the Albermarle presumption in favor of retroactive relief, we conclude it was
an error to grant such relief in this case.").
86. 435 U.S. at 721.
87. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426.
88. See generally J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (discussing the contemplation
of justice from a "veil of ignorance").
89. There is much agreement that courts have a strong impact on societal ideals. See, e.g., A.
Cox, THE WARREN COURT 27 (1968) ("The Court is often the voice of the national conscience. The
justices shape, as well as express, our natural ideals. Brown v. Board of Education restated the spirit
of America and lighted a beacon of hope for Negroes at a time when other governmental voices were
silent.").
The assertion that non-coercive judicial words can affect values and political and legal developments
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equal protection ideals even when there is an unwillingness to bear reme-
dial costs, the Court may affect the conscience and consciousness of future
generations and influence them to address any continuing legacy of slavery
and caste segregation.9"
Judicial-especially Supreme Court-proclamations do not affect only
the majority's values and world views. The dispensation of such symbols
may strongly affect the degree of recognition and community a disadvan-
taged minority group feels with the society at large.91 The monopolization
of such symbols by an effective majority may enhance, if not create, the
self-perception of powerlessness.92 In his classic novel, Invisible Man,
Ralph Ellison illuminated for American society that the pain felt by mi-
norities came not only from economic disadvantage and discrimination,
but also from the frustration of having their identity, problems, and con-
cerns go unrecognized, unacknowledged-invisible-by the society that
surrounds them.9"
Brown I at least broke the barrier of constitutional invisibility: The
equal protection clause was no longer blind to the social reality of black
Americans. The recognition of one's rights, of course, may lead to rising
expectations, and rising frustration where a remedial gap exists. Apolo-
gists for the status quo may thus be wary of both creating and legitimizing
expectations they are unwilling or unable to fulfill. Conflict and tension
is hardly novel. Dissents and concurrences represent non-coercive judicial words that have at times
had significant societal and legal impacts.
90. Law school initially grinds the legal and constitutional lenses through which most lawyers,
and many politicians and policymakers, see social reality. The law student enters her first year with
pre-existing opinions about what is good or bad, but quickly begins to learn which things are legally
cognizable. Students studying the major segregation cases discover the following memorizable lesson:
Racially identifiable school districts are not constitutionally wrong unless the inhabitants can prove
that the racially motivated acts of particular school officials caused their isolated status.
Imagine instead that law students learned that courts held racial containment in several inner cities
to violate the Constitution, but that few states had proffered adequate remedies. Racial ghettoization,
instead of being legitimated through law, would instead invoke the perception of a constitutional
gap-a gap striking at the integrity of the student's profession. Right-declaration can determine
whether racial ghettoization is seen as a constitutional non-issue or as a compelling remedial challenge
to all those concerned either with the substantive goals of the equal protection clause or with the
necessity that a society founded on the rule of law provide remedial justice.
91. Cf. P. BACHRACH & M. BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY 8 (1970) ("[T]o the extent that a
person or group-consciously or unconsciously-creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of
policy conflicts, that person or group has power."); E. SCHATISCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN
PEOPLE 71 (1960) ("Some issues are organized into politics, while other issues are organized out.");
M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLS OF PoLrrIcs (1964).
92. See J. GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERtLESNESS 15 (1980) ("[T]he means through which
power influences, shapes, or determines conceptions of necessities, possibilities, and strategies . . .
may include the study of social myths, language and symbols, and how they are shaped or manipu-
lated in power processes. . . . It may involve a focus upon the means by which social legitimations
are developed . . ").
93. See R. ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 4 (1947). ("You ache with the need to convince yourself
that you do exist in the real world, that you're a part of all the sound and anguish, and you strike out
with your fists, you curse and you swear to make them recognize you. And alas, it's seldom
successful.").
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will be inevitable. Yet refusing to recognize injustice because its admission
may energize a victim to seek his justice is an inappropriate response for
an independent judiciary. Remedying the effects of long-term discrimina-
tion will of course bring forth tension, but as Justice Blackmun wrote in
Bakke, such "tension is original Fourteenth Amendment tension, constitu-
tionally conceived and constitutionally imposed, and it is part of the
Amendment's very nature until complete equality is achieved." 94
IV. BIFURCATION AND JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY
The Bill of Rights and Article III of the Constitution reflect the
Framer's desire to ensure that neither individuals nor unpopular minori-
ties could be deprived of their rights simply by majority will." The need
for an independent judiciary to protect constitutional rights from political
whims and majoritarian hostility has proven to be especially critical for
discrete and disadvantaged minorities.9" For while the protection of one
individual's free speech protects all citizens' rights to utter unpopular
views, such universal self-interest does not exist to check majorities from
continually disadvantaging minorities and outgroups9
The structural relief necessary to remedy entrenched discrimination,
however, poses threats to the independent judicial protection of minority
rights. Structural relief is often dependent on the acquiescence of
majoritarian institutions that are both responsible for past violations and
yet in control of the police powers necessry to enforce a judicial decree. A
court's heightened vulnerability to the political branches in enforcing its
94. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 405 (1978) (Blackmun, J., separate
opinion).
95. See THE FED.RAUST No. 78, at 508 (E. Earle ed. 1937) ("This independence of the judges
is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors, which . . . have a tendency . . . to occasion . . . serious oppressions of the minor party in
the community."). This judicial function was given heightened importance in the twentieth century.
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (courts should apply a more
"searching judicial inquiry" to protect "discrete and insular minorities."). See generally J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DIsTRusT (1980) (judicial review should cleanse political process of majoritarian
abuses against minorities).
96. Leading commentators have always recognized that a vital role of our independent federal
judiciary is to transcend times of political passion to protect important values. See, e.g., A. BICKEL,
supra note 2, at 26 ("Their insulation and their marvelous mystery of time gives courts the capacity
to appeal to men's better natures, to call forth their aspiration, which may have been forgotten in the
moment's hue and cry."); C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 107 (1960) (federal courts are
"the people's institutionalized means of self-control"); see also Wellington, The Nature of Judicial
Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 493 (1982) ("Because they often deflect the momentary passions of the
majority, countermajoritarian political forces may well provide protection for longer range concerns in
politics.").
97. Both the United States Civil War and fascism in Europe increased American awareness of the
dangers of unconstrained majoritarianism where the interests of identifiable minorities are involved.
See Cover, The Origins ofJudicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1289
(1982) (In "age of Hitler," majoritarianism requited greater justification).
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remedial decrees, however, must not constrain consideration of the right.
Because such remedial dilemmas arise in direct proportion to both the
depth of past wrongs and past remedial inadequacy, such tensions are an
inappropriate reason for an independent judiciary to narrow or deny con-
stitutional rights.
Countering the case for bifurcation, however, is the claim that bifurca-
tion would destroy judicial legitimacy by encouraging decrees that would
be subject to noncompliance and ultimate nonenforcement. While issuing
decrees poses some threat to judicial legitimacy, constrained right-
declaration poses a greater threat. To alter judicial declarations of individ-
ual or minority rights because of majoritarian or political pressures is to
abdicate fundamental judicial responsibility within the constitutional sys-
tem."8 A refusal of the majority to close the gap between rights and rem-
edy speaks primarily to the lawfulness and legitimacy of the society, not
necessarily to the legitimacy of an independent judiciary. Writes Dean
Jesse Choper, "Acceptance is not the Court's responsibility, but the obli-
gation of the people; execution not its onus, but the duty of political
branches." 99
Bifurcation poses another potential danger. However formalistic the ob-
ligation to match full remedies to declared rights may be, that obligation
pressures judges to seek the actualization of the results they declare to be
just. Bifurcation could legitimize weak or insufficient remedies. Several
responses to this challenge should be considered.
First, the Supreme Court has, when faced with undesirable remedial
cases in the last fifteen years, retracted rights, which obviously results in
an inadequate remedy. If remedial inadequacy is the constant under both
frameworks, then bifurcation at least offers the benefits of right-
declaration.100 Second, bifurcation does not necessarily lead to narrower or
98. See Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (1936) (special
role of courts is to provide "the sober second thought of the community"); A. BiKEL, supra note 2, at
24 (courts are "the pronouncer[s] and guardian[s] of such values"). One of the few dialogues on the
legitimacy of gaps, however, took place in The New Republic when Bickel criticized Judge Skelly
Wright for making a judicially unenforceable right-declaration in a Washington, D.C. segregation
case. Bickel, Skelley Wright's Sweeping Decision, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 8, 1967, at 11-12.
Michael Tigar came to Wright's defense in a response the next month:
Professor Bickel's error is in assuming that a judge cannot denounce the conduct of litigants
unless he is able to provide a complete remedy. As Professor Bickel's own writings have well-
recognized, however, one great purpose of revoluntionary judicial utterance-like Brown v.
Board of Education-is to set at large with official imprimatur ideas which have theretofore
gone unspoken. This hortatory function of judging serves at times to legitimize struggle else-
where in society to attain the ends put into practice the ideas first set out by judges. Certainly
this has been one salutary effect of Brown.
Tigar, In Defense of Skelly Wright, THE NEW REPUBUC, Aug. 5, 1967, at 43.
99. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 168 (1980); see
also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.").
100. In determining the effect that bifurcation will have on remedies delivered to minority plain-
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broader remedies. Bifurcation simply separates consideration of the right
from that of the remedy, to protect agreement on the right from the inap-
propriate influence of remedial fears. Third, judges who unnecessarily
deny effective remedies,0 1 as well as judges who order massive, wide-
ranging remedies, will be subject to judicial review and developing stan-
dards for judicial discretion in different contexts. Judges will still be obli-
gated to actualize justice to the best of their abilities. Judges that leave a
right-remedy gap'O' will be forced candidly to articulate the balancing
considerations that led to their remedial order, so that courts, scholars,
and the public can review them. 0 3
Fourth, where intense political and economic strains are associated with
tiffs, one must look not to the difference between right and remedy, but rather to the difference
between remedies delivered in a bifurcated decision and remedies given in a unified decision. See
supra note 7 (discussion of bifurcation in Brown). If remedial costs are the core conflicts, and a judge
is willing in a bifurcated analysis to deliver-on a scale from one to ten-a "ten" right and a "five"
remedy, but in a unified approach only a "five" for both, then the gap resulting from bifurcation
represents a broader right-declaration, not a cheaper remedy.
101. While this Note has focused on the judicial decisionmaking process, its thesis is also relevant
to the legal strategies of lawyers. A lawyer bringing a comparable worth case, for example, may fear
that her claimed violation is so broad that the relief would be unmanageable. Instead of narrowing her
claim so as to make the necessary relief plausible to the court, the lawyer might stress to the court
that, considering the novel and important nature of the case, the court should bifurcate its considera-
tions and focus exclusively on the right at the first stage. While such a sharp bifurcation may give the
court room to leave a right-remedy gap, a lawyer might still push for this where she feels the violation
may be narrowed or denied due to remedial concerns, and where the right-declaration itself may have
positive political and societal ramifications. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86 (discussion of
Manhart).
Such strategies have not been unfamiliar in worst-remedy school cases. In San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972), plaintiffs Motion to Affirm explicitly sought a bifur-
cated opinion:
In the present case, the Plaintiffs seek merely to enjoin a system that denied them equal pro-
tection of the laws. . . . The state is left to choose among a variety of systems. . . Since many
legislatures are enacting public school education systems to meet State and lower Federal
Court decisions future determination will give the Court greater opportunity to view the effect
of the relief sought.
Id. at 11.
102. Another significant danger in requiring right-remedy matching is not simply that judges will
narrow rights, but that judges unwilling to deliver controversial remedies will develop standing re-
quirements, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), or evidentiary requirements, see Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1978), that will lead to the refusal to declare
any violation at all. See Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal
Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328 (1982) (controversial voting rights remedies encouraged intent
standard for fundamental rights case); see also Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The
Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 134 (1983) (lack of candid remedial
balancing responsible for development of highly restrictive intent standard).
103. Candor over the substantive visions encompassed in right-declarations also enhances societal
understanding of the values and value conflicts that characterize a constitutional provision. In fact, our
current understanding of the equal protection clause is partly informed by our rejection of the values
candidly condoned in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (state-fostered racial separation in-
tended to be neither stamp of second-class citizenship nor fit subject for law), and Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (denial of license to practice law because
"paramount destiny and mission of womanhood are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother."). See Gewirtz, supra note 6, at 670 (making strong argument that candor protects broader
rights in anti-discrimination law).
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complete remedies, tendencies may exist for judges to alleviate disso-
nanceT04  provoked by a right-remedy gap, by narrowing the right to
match the remedy. Bifurcation could serve as an internal check on the
judiciary to insure that such dissonance leads to confrontation-and not
legitimation-of pervasive constitutional wrongs.105
Finally, remedial obstacles tend ultimately to find their origin in past
discrimination. Even if a parent opposed busing or redrawing school dis-
trict lines on non-racist grounds, that opposition to particular remedies is
nevertheless linked to effective desegregation by past state policies that
originally fostered the segregation and the need for remedies. The severity
of even legitimate obstacles to effective desegregation will be proportionate
to the effectiveness of past discrimination in physically and psychologically
separating the races. To retract-even slightly-the right at stake because
of such obstacles, serves to perpetuate the power of past discrimination in
the guise of alleviating it. Where the wrong is deep enough, and if right-
remedy matching is required, social reality will almost compel a discrimi-
natory jurisprudence of anti-discrimination law.10 6 Bifurcation allows
104. See L. FESTrINGER, A THEORY OF COGNrriVE DISSONANCE 3 (1962) ("The existence of
dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the disso-
nance and achieve consonance."). Notably the first example in this book is "[a] person may think
Negroes are just as good as whites but would not want any living in his neighborhood." Id. at 1.
Festinger also cites Myrdal's An American Dilemma as a "good statement of some of the reasons why
strong dissonance exists in this area." Id. at 7. In light of the Supreme Court's continued refusal to
consider the housing discrimination found by the trial courts in recent segregation cases, it is worth
noting that the second half of Festinger's basic hypothesis is that "the person will actively avoid
situations and information which would likely increase dissonance."
105. Professor Gewirtz advocates a position with which this Note is in agreement: Right-
declaration can ultimately serve the ideal value at stake. See Gewirtz, supra note 6, at 670-74.
Gewirtz' article, however, admittedly assumes that the right will remain static regardless of the con-
templated remedy. Id. at 593 n.17. Under this assumption, Gewirtz' willingness to have a judge
shuttle back and forth between right and remedy seems reasonable. Id. at 679. This Note contends,
however, that the very crux of the post-Swann cases has been the negative, backwards dynamism
between the remedy and the right. Where a court is dependent on a hostile majority for the imple-
mentation of a corrective structural remedy, the tendencies to narrow rights will often be powerful. In
rejecting Owen Fiss' discussion of bifurcation, id. at 677-80, Gewirtz gives far too little attention to
the role that bifurcation may play as an institutional mechanism to check both against the compromis-
ing of judicial independence and against the potential for judicial dissonance to be soothed by con-
tracting the right to fit the remedy.
Because Gewirtz seems to desire a powerful role for right-declaration in the face of remedial crisis,
it is surprising that he never adequately discusses whether bifurcation may be the best judicial policy
to achieve such objectives. Instead, he tells us only that judicial legitimacy problems "cannot be
solved" by bifurcation. Id. at 679-80 (emphasis added). Yet neither Fiss, nor this Note, contend that
bifurcation can solve all problems of judicial legitimacy in the way a new medical discovery cures a
disease. In fact, the thrust of Fiss' discussion, see Fiss, supra note 3, at 51-58, is that the problem of
remedial implementation and judicial independence is a core dilemma that defies ultimate solution but
must be resolved as well as possible. Ultimately, bifurcation as advocated in this Note would best
facilitate the role of law that Gewirtz advocates elsewhere in his article. See Gewirtz, supra note 6, at
587-95, 665-74.
106. This tendency for remedial obstacles for minority rights to be linked to past discrimination
justifies a strict conceptual bifurcation to prevent inappropriate remedial factors from tugging at and
restricting the right. But see Gewirtz, supra note 6, at 676 ("[Jludges may take account of. . .even
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equal protection ideals to survive remedial obstacles, and in turn, to gen-
erate a climate that inspires society to confront and conquer them.
In analyzing the strains that segregation places upon the judiciary, it
too often goes unrecognized that such cases revolve in an arena of societal
illegitimacy: an illegitimacy that exists where the effects of state-fueled
discrimination persist in a society committed to equal justice under law.
From this perspective, analysis of judicial legitimacy gains a clearer focus:
The task becomes not simply to count flaws in specific judicial proposals,
but to ask what is the most legitimate-or least detrimental-role10 7 for
our judiciary to play in confronting this pre-existing societal dilemma.
CONCLUSION
In 1883, the political realities that had inspired both the Civil War
Amendments and the legislative efforts to assist the freed slaves took a
turn for the worse. The 1875 Civil Rights Act had lost popular support,
and in the Civil Rights Cases' of 1883, the Supreme Court overturned
the Act, claiming Congress lacked the power to outlaw racial discrimina-
tion in public accommodations. Shortly after the decision, Frederick
Douglass said at a Civil Rights Mass-Meeting:
It is said that this decision will make no difference in the treatment
of colored people; that the Civil Rights Bill was a dead letter, and
could not be enforced. There is some truth in all this, but it is not
the whole truth. That bill, like all advanced legislation, was a ban-
ner on the outer wall of American liberty, a noble moral standard,
uplifted for the education of the American people. There are tongues
in trees, books, in the running brooks,-sermons in stones. This law,
though dead, did speak. It expressed the sentiment of justice and fair
play, common to every honest heart. Its voice was against popular
prejudice and meanness. . . . It told the American people that they
were all equal before the law; that they belonged to a common coun-
try and were equal citizens. The Supreme Court has hauled down
this flag of liberty in open day. . . .It is a concession to race pride,
selfishness and meanness, and will be received with joy by every up-
holder of caste in the land, and for this I deplore and denounce that
decision.' 0 9
resistance at the right-declaring stage as part of the cluster of factors that influence. . . rights").
107. This term is borrowed from J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & P. SoLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 6 (1973). The authors favor this term in cases of child abuse so that the
decisionmaker fully appreciates that he or she is confronting an unavoidably negative situation. Id. at
53-64. The advantage of this perspective for judicial review of entrenched discrimination is to deter
the rejection of judicial policies because they are imperfect instead of because a less detrimental theory
exists.
108. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
109. 4 P. FONER, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 401 (1955). Compare
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Thirteen years later, the moral and constitutional standard for equality
for over a half-century was set in Plessy v. Ferguson.110
-Gene B. Sperling
with Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1902) (Holmes, J.) (in case involving attempt of Alabama
state legislature to disenfranchise black voters, jurisdiction refused because "the great mass of the
white population intends to keep the blacks from voting. . . [and] . . . a name on a piece of paper
will not defeat them. . . . [R]elief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a
state and the State itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and political department of the
government of the United States."). See supra note 75.
110. See G. MYRDAL, supra note 43, at 30, 46 (1944):
1It was a not unusual experience of the writer to be told. . . by the learned. . . [and]...
by the laity, that there is 'no Negro problem' in America . . . . In the big cities where the
greater part of the total Northern Negro population lives, the whites are protected from getting
the Negro problem too much on their minds by. . . the spatial segregation of racial, ethnic,
and economic groups ....
See Herbers, Census Data Reveal 70's Legacy: Poorer Cities and Richer Suburbs, N.Y. Times, Feb.
27, 1983, at 1, col. 2 (U.S. Census show inner cities becoming increasingly poor and increasingly
concentrated with minorities); Rohatyn, Catching Up, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1985, at E5, col. 5
("Clearly, you have to try to break down the ghetto structure. . . . [and the] racial aspects to these
problems. . . . You know, everybody talked about city problems 10 years ago. Today you never hear
it. It's as if they didn't exist anymore.").
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